The 'Metaphysics of Dasein' is the name which Heidegger gave to a new philosophical project developed immediately after the partial publication of his masterwork Being and Time (1927). As Heidegger was later to recall, an 'overturning' took place at that moment, more precisely right in the middle of the 1929 treatise On the Essence of Ground. Between the fundamental-ontological formulation of the question of being and its metaphysical rephrasing, Heidegger discovered that a 'metaphysical freedom' stood at the root of Dasein's relation to his world and, thus, at the basis of his whole ontological questioning. This article will show how the very structure of the 1929 essay clearly illustrates the path Heidegger followed between Being and Time and the new philosophical beginning of the mid-1930s. It will conclude with a few critical remarks concerning Heidegger's attempt to free his thinking from traditional philosophy and to overcome metaphysics.
Introduction
As soon as Heidegger finished the writing of his masterwork Sein und Zeit, somewhere in the fall of 1926, a shift occurred in his use of the term 'metaphysics'. We have to recall that Sein und Zeit was written against 'metaphysics'. The first line of the book left no doubt: 'The question [of 2 being] has today been forgotten-although our time considers itself progressive in again affirming "metaphysics"' (Heidegger, 2001a: p. 2/1) . ii Heidegger refers here to a 'resurrection of metaphysics' that gained popularity at the beginning of the 20 th century with authors such as This would be a harmless discovery if, during those years, Heidegger had written texts of a lesser philosophical value and if we could speak of some 'mental turmoil' causing Heidegger to think metaphysics was still possible. But according to many scholars, these years could be considered the most prolific years of all. Admitting that his question of being was in fact a metaphysical question, Heidegger produced some of his most interesting texts. The publication of Heidegger's manuscripts allowed the discovery of this unknown phase of his (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) , which corresponds to the development of a 'metaphysics of Dasein'.
Weg
But despite the obvious philosophical value of these texts, it may seem paradoxical to take this attempt to lay anew the grounds of metaphysics seriously. From the mid-1930s on, Heidegger wanted to proceed to a recasting of the essence of metaphysics in order to provide it with an authentic base.
As I mentioned earlier, Heidegger first exposed a positive concept of 'metaphysics' in the winter semester of 1926/27. From this moment on, Heidegger spoke of a 'scientific metaphysics'
and opposed it to a 'popular concept (vulgärer Begriff) of metaphysics' (Heidegger, 2006: pp. 7-10) .
Invoking Kant, who is said to have 'tried to destroy the non-philosophical metaphysics in order to achieve a scientific metaphysics,' Heidegger defines the 'popular' metaphysics as dealing ontically with God and the world's ground. On the contrary, the scientific metaphysics does not approach 'being from its ontical origin,' but moves within the 'sobriety and coldness of the concept' (Heidegger, 2006: p. 7) . The same would be said in the Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie in the next semester, in which Heidegger wrote:
The transcendental science of being has nothing to do with popular metaphysics, which deals with some being behind the known beings; rather, the scientific concept of metaphysics is identical with the concept of philosophy in general-critically transcendental science of being, ontology. (Heidegger, 1975: p. 23 (Heidegger, 1975: pp. 249, 447/175, 314) as well as a rejection of the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant's concept of transcendental knowledge (Heidegger, 1975: p. 425/299 (…) is freedom' (Heidegger, 1976: p. 186/142 ). The lecture course that followed the end of this metaphysical interlude has to be considered a breaking point in many ways. First of all, we have to remember that in this lecture course
Heidegger openly abandoned phenomenology to Husserl. Even though he stopped using the phenomenological vocabulary for a while, the rupture with Husserl was now complete. As
Heidegger said, 'we would do better in the future to give the name of phenomenology only to that which Husserl himself has created and continues to produce' (Heidegger, 1980: p. 40/29) .
Heidegger also abandoned the use of ontological vocabulary to characterize his thinking and tried to reinterpret it in terms of an 'ontochrony,' in which, as he writes, 'chronos stands in the place of logos' (Heidegger, 1980: p. 144/100; see also Heidegger, 1999: 95) . This ontochronical undertaking did not prosper, but surely indicates that Heidegger was already seeking something new.
We also have to take into account the coining in this lecture course of the expression 'ontotheology,' a term not to be confused with the one appearing in Kant or in Schopenhauer. From this lecture course on, metaphysics would be thought of as achieved once and for all in Hegel, with no possibility of retrieval. And this achievement lets us finally see the structure it had had all along: the onto-theological structure that, from Aristotle's prōte philosophia to Hegel's identification of ontology with a 'theo-logic' (Theo-Logik) (Heidegger, 1997: p. 32; 2001b: p. 70 Aristotle's Metaphysics, the vocabulary of the overcoming or the surpassing (überholen) of metaphysics would then substitute that of the retrieval (wiederholen) (Heidegger, 1981: pp. 81-2/68-9). In the introductory part of this course, Heidegger ironically referred to his past attempt, saying: 'Do we really know what this thing is that we so commonly call "metaphysics"? We do not. Nowadays the word bewitches us like a magical incantation, with its suggestion of profundity and its promise of salvation' (Heidegger, 1981: p. 3/1).
If this coining of the onto-theological vocabulary is so important, it is because Heidegger, in his metaphysical period, did not use metaphysical vocabulary in a merely rhetorical fashion, but really tried to give a specific solution to the problematical unity of metaphysics as it first explicitly appeared in Aristotle's concept of prōte philosophia. Although the concept of 'ontotheology' only appeared at the beginning of the 1930s, the 'idea' behind it was already present in the mid-1920s.
x Thus, when Heidegger planned a retrieval of metaphysical questioning, he was already perfectly aware of this dual structure.
II The onto-theological constitution of the metaphysics of Dasein
In fact, Heidegger always thought of his metaphysics of Dasein as the retrieval (Wiederholung) of an unsolved problem in Aristotle: that of the unity of the ontological and theological questionings. But Heidegger did not try to solve first philosophy's 'remarkable doubling' or even to reconcile it into a unity. Heidegger's task was rather to 'illuminate the grounds for the apparent disunity and the manner in which both determinations belong together as the leading problem of a "first philosophy" of beings' (Heidegger, 1998: p. 8/5 ). This obscure relationship between the question of beings (to on) and the question of the divine (to theion)-unquestioned since the death of Aristotle (Heidegger, 1983: pp. 51-3/32-5; 1997: p. 34 )-has to be interrogated as to its unity and its origin.
The metaphysics of Dasein tried to investigate more radically the traditional metaphysical problems. Besides the ontological problems, Heidegger opened a realm of questioning where beings are no longer questioned in their being or their beingness, but rather as a whole (im Ganzen). In some texts, Heidegger explicitly presented his metaphysics of Dasein following the onto-theological structure. These texts show that Heidegger did not then conceive the ontotheological problem as a faulty path for philosophical questioning, but as a possible access to philosophy's basic questions.
The first two texts that I will discuss are taken from the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, in which Heidegger traces explicit parallels between the Aristotelian division of Metaphysics (prōte philosophia/theologike episteme) and divisions that exist inside his own thought.
The first text, often commented on, is taken from the famous appendix inserted in the middle of the second part and entitled 'Describing the Idea and Function of a Fundamental Ontology' (Heidegger, 1978: pp. 196-202/154-9) . The initial plan of the systematic part of Sein und Zeit's fundamental ontology consisted of two essential sections: an 'interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality' and an 'explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being' (Heidegger, 2001a: p. 41/37) . In the summer semester 1928, Heidegger added a third section to this fundamental ontology. As he then wrote, this third section should not be understood as a step further, but as a 'turning-around' (Kehre) of this analysis, an 'overturning' (Umschlag) that enables the fully developed fundamental ontology to return to its ontical point of departure: 'The temporal analysis is at the same time the turning-around, where ontology itself expressly runs back into the metaphysical ontic (in die metaphysische Ontik) in which it implicitly always remains' (Heidegger, 1978: p. 201/158 encompasses the unity of three ontological determinations: 'facticity (thrownness), existence (project) and falling prey (Verfallen)' (Heidegger, 2001a: p. 284/262) . This twofold of existence and thrownness of which the passage speaks is a subject that Heidegger often mentioned with this unique formula: 'thrown project' (Heidegger, 2001a: p. 285/263; 1998: p. 235/165 ).
According to this characterization, Dasein would stand between the power to project the possibilities of a world (project) and a complete helplessness as to the withdrawal of some of these possibilities (thrownness). Only a complete analysis of this notion would give us an understanding of the parallel Heidegger traces with the Aristotelian division of metaphysics.
However, what matters here is to recognize the existence of such parallels.
We should also mention Heidegger's characterization of the 'authentic concept of metaphysics,' in the winter semester 1928/29. In this Einleitung in die Philosophie, Heidegger described the tasks of his philosophical investigations not with the twofold of fundamental ontology and metontology, but with a dichotomy between the problem of being and the problem of the world. Once again, Heidegger seems to acknowledge the limits of his ontological approach and tries to give a more complete idea of philosophy. Even though Heidegger did not mention Aristotle's Metaphysics, the many interpretations he then gave of Aristotelian theology in terms of a worldly or 'pagan' problematic suggest that this problem of the world has to be understood as the problem of the theion, the problem of beings as a whole.
xiii
In the winter semester 1928/29, the problem of the world was presented as a complementary problem to that of being, in such a way that their unity is then said to form philosophy's complete problematic: 'The problem of the world is primordially united with the problem of being; in their unity, the problem of being and the problem of the world first determine the unity of the authentic concept of metaphysics' (Heidegger, 1996: pp. 323-4) . But the connection between both problems was outlined without being fully developed: 'The problem of being-in its originality-unfolds necessarily in what we call the problem of the world' : p.
391). And further:
On his side, the problem of the world, once unfolded, does not allow itself to be isolated, but bursts again and bounces on the construction of the problem of being. The problem of being unfolds as the problem of the world, the problem of the world sinks into the problem of being-this means: both problems form philosophy's one problematic. (Heidegger, 1996: p. 394)
The onto-theological structure of the metaphysics of Dasein was thus presented in various ways at the end of the 1920s. But as already mentioned, the concept of 'onto-theology' only appeared in the winter semester 1930/31 on Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes, and with a negative connotation. From then on, this metaphysical structure would represent a characteristic peculiar to this traditional interrogation on beings (as such and as a whole) which the fundamental philosophical question concerning being has to overcome. The emergence of this distinction between philosophy's Leitfrage and Grundfrage coincides with the abandonment of this attempt to explicitly retrieve Aristotle's dual conception of philosophy. When Heidegger identified the onto-theological structure with the incapacity of metaphysics to ask correctly the question of being, it should be seen as a direct critique of the metaphysical attempt that he had made in the preceding years-an attempt that was onto-theological in a 'positive' way.
The Brief über den 'Humanismus' of November 1946 would later confirm that the achievement of Sein und Zeit 'did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics' (Heidegger, 1976: p. 328/250). Even clearer is the letter Heidegger wrote to Max Müller in November 1947, in which he said that the very title Sein und Zeit was a catastrophe, as was the whole effort of that time, as it never succeeded in overcoming 'the onto-theological basis of metaphysics' (Heidegger, 2003: p. 15) . If, for a few years, Heidegger took up the onto-theological challenge-which was then intended to try to solve, in a 'retrieval manner,' the problematic unity of metaphysics-, he later considered it an attempt fully embedded in that 'incurable' metaphysical structure, and tried to overcome it. The mere idea of 'authentic metaphysics' is thus contradictory. Of course, this does not mean that Heidegger would ever purely 'reject' the ontological or metaphysical attempts he made in the 1920s. It was, it might be said, a necessary step towards a transition (Übergang) to a new beginning. If we can easily speak of Sein und Zeit as a failure because the promised 'concrete answer to the question of the meaning of being' (Heidegger, 2001a: p. 19/17) was never given, it seems impossible to do so for the metaphysics of Dasein. As such, it didn't make any promises apart from these two: 'to develop metaphysics from the ground up' (Heidegger, 1978: 165/132) and 'to present a new laying of its grounds' : p. 1/1). As we have just seen, this developing of metaphysics allowed a transition toward something else and opened the way to a reconsideration of the fundamental ontology. It accomplished its task by discovering an ontological or metaphysical concept of freedom that grounds the preontological understanding of being on which Sein und Zeit established itself.
III

Vom Wesen des Grundes
IV Freedom and the overcoming of metaphysics
In the post-Kehre perspective of the Beiträge, we could thus argue that by accomplishing the demolition (Zerstörung) of the fundamental ontology-that is, by accomplishing the turning-, the metaphysics of Dasein should not be considered a failure. The 'more original elaboration of the idea of metaphysics' of which Vom Wesen des Grundes speaks thus represents, in this later perspective, the first draft of an overcoming of metaphysics. We could then speak of the metaphysics of Dasein as an accomplishment, and not as a failure.
As we saw at the end of the first section, Heidegger began to mention this surpassing As Jean-Luc Nancy argued in his 1988 book L'expérience de la pensée, we can identify various steps in Heidegger's reflections on freedom (Nancy, 1988: pp. 54-5/35-6 (Heidegger, 1982: 300/203 In the second reading, the gesture of retrieval was replaced by the 'gesture of separation' (Nancy, 1988: p. 59/39) . The Auseinandersetzung with tradition is still thought of as an attempt to free oneself from tradition, but a certain resolution to free tradition from our traditional interpretations has been lost. We can talk about two ways of freeing oneself from tradition in What are beings in respect to their being? What is being? What is being understood as?
We have, so to speak, dug more and more into the content of the leading question, and thereby dug out more primordial questions. (Heidegger 1982: 111/78) But this slow development of the fundamental question that would take its point of departure in the traditional way of questioning beings was replaced, in the Beiträge, by the idea of a 'leap' (Sprung) that disclosed the necessity of a new beginning:
Going from the leading question to the fundamental question, there is never an immediate, equi-directional and continual process that once again applies the leading question (to be-ing); rather, there is only a leap, i.e., the necessity of an other beginning. (Nancy, 1988: p. 59/40) . The metaphysical freedom (freedom toward ground) and its corresponding metaphysics of freedom that Heidegger developed at the end of the 1920s vanished with this necessity of a new beginning. Freedom no longer represented the possibility of freeing oneself from mere tradition and could only be understood as the mark of subjectivity. This distance taken from freedom can be regarded, as Nancy argues, as the final separation from metaphysical thinking. In fact, the 1936 lecture course on Schelling was probably the last occurrence of a positive notion of metaphysics in Heidegger's works (Heidegger, 1971: p. 79) xx . The second lecture courses on Schelling left no doubt as to the necessity of abandoning metaphysics and freedom altogether:
Freedom: metaphysically as the name for the capacity to begin something by itself (spontaneity, cause). As soon as it moves metaphysically into the centre (into true metaphysics) it intrinsically unifies the determination of cause and selfhood . . . that is, of subjectivity. In the perspective of a more initial thought, a thought of the history of being, freedom forfeited its role. (Heidegger, 1971: p. 330) Freedom set Heidegger free from his fundamental-ontological path and the 'crisis of the question of being' that this metaphysical framework had to bring about. For some years,
Heidegger still considered human freedom from a positively metaphysical perspective. But the attempt to free his thinking from subjectivity finally forced him to free it from any reference to freedom, understood as the modern concepts of autonomy and self-regulation.
The overcoming of metaphysics-and of freedom, as we have seen-would have major consequences on Heidegger's relation to the history of philosophy. Leaving behind Western philosophy as constituting 'only' the first beginning, Heidegger also abandoned one of his most inventive and fertile projects: that of phenomenological destructuring. Even if we can argue that destructuring was never fully abandoned by Heidegger, the basic concept of retrieval that is essentially linked to it proved incompatible with the idea of a new beginning. Plato, Aristotle, Kant or Schelling are no longer regarded as 'allies' in his search for a 'concrete answer to the question of the meaning of being,' but only as halts on the route of a Seynsgeschichte. The dialogue with them still exists, but the very project of finding new questions hidden behind 'concealments' produced by tradition has lost its meaning. The peculiar yet productive relation that Heidegger's thought had with history in the 1920s has been lost on the way. If Heidegger's path can be followed with great interest up to the overcoming of metaphysics and this freeing from freedom, the loss of methodological tools such as destructuring and retrieval may nevertheless seem too high a price to pay. These tools represent core concepts for what we call, for want of anything better, 'continental' philosophy and have inspired a whole generation of philosophers. xxi The retrieval of philosophical questions is, in the end, the condition of possibility of any positive and productive dialogue with the philosophical tradition. And if we are to debate with our contemporaries on shared philosophical questions, it might also be the basic nature of any philosophical dialogue.
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